Radhamohanpur is a quiet village that has faced food insecurity for years. Why did these concerns suddenly erupt into violent unrest on 16 September 2007?
The state of West Bengal has for many years operated the national Public Distribution System (PDS) to supply essential commodities at a subsidised price through an extensive network of fair-priced shops to both rural and urban Below Poverty Level (BPL) households. However, concerns about food security in the region were apparent for years. In fact, food had become highly politicised, with those who distributed it becoming wealthy and powerful, at the expense of those most in need.
When it happened, the uprising in Radhamohanpur – part of Burdwan Division – quickly spilled over into neighbouring divisions.
The National Sample Survey (NSS), a central government investigation released in February 2007, found that most rural poor in northern and eastern India failed to receive regular rations of food. It was evidenced that rural West Bengal had the highest number of BPL households facing seasonal starvation with 23.3% of those household livelihoods rooted in agricultural labour. The NSS further revealed that food distributors were hoarding grain and selling it for premium prices on the open market. Rising wheat prices also prompted APL households to demand wheat rations from the PDS.
The elected Left Front government led by the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPM), had been in place since 1977. Under this regime, significant land reforms impacting agricultural communities had been rolled out to favour private companies (eg Tata Motors). Such land grabbing led to farmer protests and eventually the State returned the land, though not without suffering loss of party allegiance. The CPM is a cadre-based party with representation throughout villages in significant positions such as teacher’s unions and ration dealer’s associations. It was acknowledged that some of these roles owned the only two-storey homes in villages. Villagers had also reported to the local CPM that not only had regular food rations not been received, dealers had been seen transporting and selling food rations outside of the village.
The PDS in West Bengal has become increasingly burdensome for the government with the cost of procurement, storage and distribution outstripping the issue price. By 2007, West Bengal had a population of about 80 million, with about 24.7% being BPL and unable to afford market priced staples of rice, wheat, sugar and edible oil. Of the BPL households, the PDS was able to subsidise roughly 12%-15% total food. Starvation and undernourishment had become normalised in many villages, seemingly not benefitting from the PDS. A system that failed to deal with increasing incidence of poverty while facilitating a widening gap between rich and poor.
In Radhamhanpur, villagers had caught local food dealers on at least two occasions selling PDS grain outside of the village, and reported this to the ruling CPM. However, villagers felt that the CPM was not only protecting dealers over the years, as no action was taken, but financially benefitting from party donations from dealers’ growing wealth.
On 16 September 2007 in Radhamohanpur a perfect storm gathered.
Widespread public anger triggered by food ration shortages linked to corruption of the PDS sees villagers riot after feeling cheated for many years. Existing tension was evident, frustrations increased with a failure of the state to take action. The national survey confirmed the belief held by millions, of a corrupt system resulting in hunger and a widening gap between rich and poor. Angry villagers mobilised quickly in search of answers, compensation, punishment for the accused and assurances of a corrupt free PDS future.
During September to October 2007 protests in other divisions erupted into violence with dealer’s homes set on fire, homes looted for jewellery, eight arrests and bailed 90 days following, 300 injured and two shot dead by police. At least three food distributors were captured at this time and told to pay fines – unable to raise the cash or in combination with public shaming, they killed themselves.
Opportunities largely leverage decentralised, democratic, participatory and representative models.
CPM had a legacy of distrust based on land-grabbing, theft of PDS rations and lack of response to village concerns of not receiving PDS rations and also reporting dealers diverting and selling PDS rations. Rebuilding trust by the party was essential and requires accountability and transparency measures, eg:
Villagers had decided to take action in the form of insisting on change at a formal exclusive CPM party meeting. Villagers had mobilised quickly and strategically by organising a roving rickshaw and slogan campaign to build momentum with neighbouring villages. Villagers were simply seeking for their voices to be heard and to be represented in an official capacity. Measures could include:
The village may benefit from capacity building in some disaster risk management and peace-building measures, eg:
Government, corruption, poverty, subsidies, unrest, food shortages, suicide.